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BOOLOS’ HARDEST LOGIC PUZZLE EVER IN ITS PUREST FORM
JUAN J. COLOMINA-ALMIN˜ANA AND PABLO RAU´L STINGA
Abstract. This article takes at heart Boolos’ intentions when presenting “The Hardest
Logic Puzzle Ever.” We stress the fact that Boolos instructs us to solve the puzzle by
asking three yes-no questions. It is a requirement that all the gods, including Random
-whose behavior is determined by the outcome of flipping a coin in its head-, are always
obliged to answer. Moreover, Boolos’ solution implies that the meaning of “Da” and “Ja”
is irrelevant to solve the puzzle, and, at the same time, that all of this would be in virtue of
the irreducible fundamentality of “the Law of the Excluded Middle.” The purpose of this
paper is, then, twofold. First, we prove that Boolos’ original puzzle cannot be solved, in an
absolute deterministic way, in less than three yes-no admissible questions. This does not
mean that one could identify the gods’ identities in less than three questions, which chances,
second, we compute as well.
1. Introduction
The main aim of this paper is to emphasize the importance of what Boolos actually sug-
gested as the proper way of addressing “The Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever,” whose origin he
attributes to Raymond Smullyan (cf. [1]). Regarding this, we would like to start by reminding
the reader that, according to Boolos, the significance of the puzzle is the following:
“There is a law of logic called “the law of excluded middle,” according to which
either X is true or not-X is true, for any statement X at all. (“The law of non-
contradiction” asserts that statements X and not-X aren’t both true.) Mathemati-
cians and philosophers have occasionally attacked the idea that excluded middle is
a logically valid law. We can’t hope to settle the debate here, but can observe that
our solution to puzzle 1 made essential use of excluded middle, exactly when we said
“Whether the middle card is an ace or not. . . ” It is clear from The Hardest Logic
Puzzle Ever, and even more plainly from puzzle 1, that our ability to reason about
alternative possibilities, even in everyday life, would be almost completely paralyzed
were we to be denied the use of the law of excluded middle.” [1, p. 65]
What this paragraph tells us is, precisely, that if one wants to obtain a valid solution
according to the rules posed by The Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever in the spirit and form professed
by Boolos, one has to apply the Law of Excluded Middle. Otherwise, if one primarily employs
the Law of Non-Contradiction, some scenarios immediately follow that invalidate a solution
according to Boolos’ guidelines: Say, one has to accept that gods’ heads might explode or
that some gods might not be able to answer “Da” or “Ja” to certain questions. We will
elaborate on the latter point in Section 4.
It is the aim of this paper to emphasize that, if we were to preserve the original spirit of
Boolos’ work [1], then we should take at heart this conservative claim regarding the classical
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laws of logic to solve his puzzle. It is plain obvious that we assumed that one has to first
accept the feasibility of the Law of Excluded Middle. As it will be shown, it follows that in
order to solve the puzzle while keeping Boolos’ spirit we must restrict ourselves to a set of
admissible questions to pose to the gods. The concept of admissible question is presented in
Definition A. This is a novel notion introduced for the first time in this paper to analyze the
philosophical implications of the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever.
Let us consider again Boolos’ quote from [1] mentioned at the beginning. We want to
remind that the Law of Excluded Middle tells us that in scenarios where there are three
possibilities, XY Z, when something is identified as non-X, there is an open possibility that
that same thing could be either Y or Z. Keeping this in mind, let us think again about
puzzle 1 in Boolos’ original article:
Puzzle 1: Noting their locations, I place two aces and a jack face down on a table,
in a row; you do not see which card is placed where. Your problem is to point to
one of the three cards and then ask me a single yes-no question, from the answer
to which you can, with certainty, identify one of the three cards as an ace. If you
have pointed to one of the aces, I will answer your question truthfully. However, if
you have pointed to the jack, I will answer your question yes or no, completely at
random. [1, p. 63]
Besides the fact that it seems to be an election between two alternatives (Ace or Jack),
Boolos points out that it is actually indifferent which is the identity of the card that was
placed in the middle. This makes us believe that one should treat this as a case where one
has to find out the identities of three different individuals/tokens (Ace1, Ace2 and Jack) if
one wants to have an absolute answer to the puzzle. As we said before, this is due to the fact
that when the ordinary reasoning that follows from the Law of Excluded Middle is applied,
one can only find out whether the selected card in the first place is an Ace or the Jack, and
from there one can then deduce the rest. Formally, one finds out either J (which then gives
options A1 and A2 as only follow-ups) or non-J (which then gives J and A2 as the only
options).
We can think about this on a related case: From the fact that “I have purchased a car
painted in a primary color and my new car is not blue,” it does not follow that the car is
red, since it is a plausible possibility that the color could be yellow (if you are into this kind
of flashy cars, of course).
Keeping all of this in mind, this article will reinforce Boolos’ [1] and Roberts’ [3] original
intuitions regarding the laws of logic and our ordinary ways of reasoning. To do so we deepen
into some arguments that, we believe, are crucial for understanding the importance of Boolos’
purpose when formulating The Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever and his three-question solution.
All of this, combined, shall help us confirm our suggestion that it is not possible to have an
absolute solution to the puzzle in less than three questions.
2. The Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever
George Boolos [1, p. 62] presents the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever. The puzzle goes like this
(boldface is ours):
Three gods A, B, and C are called, in some order, True, False, and Random. True
always speaks truly, False always speaks falsely, but whether Random speaks truly
or falsely is a completely random matter. Your task is to determine the identities
of A, B, and C by asking three yes-no questions; each question must be put to
exactly one god. The gods understand English, but will answer all questions
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in their own language, in which the words for “yes” and “no” are “da” and “ja,” in
some order. You do not know which word means which.
Boolos also gives the following guidelines (boldface is ours):
(a) It could be that some god gets asked more than one question (and hence that
some god is not asked any questions at all).
(b) What the second question is, and to which god it is put, may depend
on the answer to the first question. (And, of course, similarly for the third
question).
(c) Whether Random speaks truly or not should be thought of as depending on
the flip of a coin hidden in his brain: If the coin comes down heads, he
speaks truly; if tails, falsely.
(d) Random will answer “Da” or “Ja” when asked any yes-no question.
We stress the fact that Boolos instructs us to solve the puzzle with three yes-no questions.
It is also a requirement that all the gods, including Random, will always answer. Moreover,
it is implied in Boolos’ solution that the meaning of “Da” and “Ja” is irrelevant to solve the
puzzle (in other words, semantics does no determine our ontology), and, at the same time,
that all of this would be in virtue of the irreducible fundamentality of “the Law of Excluded
Middle.”
Roberts [3] reinforces Boolos’ instructions and solution. Indeed, he presents another three-
question solution to the puzzle, where the gods always reply either “Da” or “Ja,” and the
use of “the Law of Excluded Middle” is crucial.
The aim of this article is then twofold. First, we prove that Boolos’ original puzzle cannot
be solved, in an absolute deterministic way, in less than three yes-no questions. Towards this
end, and for the sake of establishing this claim in a rigorous way, we introduce the natural
concept of admissible question, see Definition A. Nevertheless, this does not mean that one
could not be lucky enough to find the gods’ identities in less than three questions. It is for
this reason that, second, we shall compute the chances of solving Boolos’ original puzzle by
asking no questions (!), and with one and two yes-no (admissible) questions, respectively, as
well.
Before presenting our results, however, we need to make the following crucial considerations
regarding Boolos’ instructions that will guide and justify our analysis.
Boolos’ original formulation requires that the gods “will answer all questions in their
own language”. In other words, this sentence entails the rule that the gods are obliged to
answer. This in particular implies that not every yes-no question may be asked, as it comes
out of the nature of the gods themselves. To clarify this point further, consider, for example,
the question
(Q)
“Are you going to answer to this question
with a word that means ‘no’ in your language?”
This is a question that neither god True nor Random speaking Truly can answer without
violating their nature (for Random it would mean to reverse the outcome of the coin in
its head). Indeed, suppose that we ask (Q) to god True T and, for the sake of simplicity,
T responds in English. If T replies ‘yes’ then T is speaking falsely, because it is claiming
that indeed will answer to the question with the word ‘no’ but it is actually saying ‘yes’, a
contradiction to its nature. On the other hand, if T answers ‘no’ then again T is speaking
falsely, because it is claiming that will not answer the question with the word ‘no’, that
is, it will answer ‘yes’, but it is actually saying ‘no’, a contradiction with its nature again.
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Therefore, T will not be able to answer to (Q) without violating its nature. For the case of
god Random speaking Truly, the same reasoning applies. However, (Q) would be admissible
as directed to god False or god Random speaking Falsely. In fact, say we ask (Q) to god
False F and, for the sake of simplicity, F responds in English. By following the analysis we
did before for T , we immediately see that there is no contradiction when F responds either
‘yes’ or ‘no’. Both answers are lies, and that is perfectly in accordance with the nature of F .
Therefore, F will answer either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (that is, “Da” or “Ja” in its own language) to
question (Q). Posing question (Q) to god Random speaking Falsely yields no contradiction
as well. Such a basic example shows that there must be a subclass of the class of all yes-no
questions that is admissible. Hence we introduce the following notion.
Definition A. A question Q is admissible for god A if and only if A will answer either “Da”
or “Ja” to Q.
It is important to observe that The Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever already has a class of
permissible questions, namely, the class of all yes-no questions. Therefore, and in order to
keep Boolos’ spirit, we are compelled to tailor the class of possible questions as they have
to be dynamic in relation to the epistemic space. Notice as well that the set of admissible
questions does not need to be static. In fact, Boolos remarks in guideline (b) that “What
the second question is, and to which god it is put, may depend on the answer to the
first question” (boldface is ours). As our proof of Theorem B will show, either a static or a
dynamic set of admissible questions will still yield the same outcome: Three yes-no questions,
and no less, are needed to solve the puzzle with absolute certainty. We elaborate more on
this again in Section 4 when comparing with other works.
As we have mentioned, the spirit of this paper is to rescue and emphasize the work of Boolos
in its purest form. We prove that his original puzzle cannot deterministically be solved in
less than three admissible yes-no questions. Our proof demonstrates that the necessity of
a three-question solution to deterministically solve the puzzle is independent of what we
actually ask, the meaning of “Da” and “Ja,” and the triviality of the distinction between
truth-tellers and liars. In addition, even for Random behaving as in Boolos’ instructions (and
not by just “answering randomly”, see Section 4), a three-question solution is unavoidable.
3. The three-question solution to The Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever
As anticipated, we prove the following:
Theorem B. Boolos’ Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever cannot deterministically be solved in less
than three admissible yes-no questions.
Proof. According to Boolos [1] and Roberts [3], the puzzle can deterministically be solved in
three admissible yes-no questions. Therefore, the only thing we must prove is that there are
no single-question or two-question deterministic solutions to the puzzle.
To restate the puzzle, the problem is to determine the identities of the three gods: A, B,
and C, which are T = True, F = False, and R = Random, in some order. There are then 6
different possible identification scenarios, S1–S6, see Table 1.
First, we shall prove that there is no a single-question deterministic solution to the puzzle.
Without loss of generality, we address the first admissible yes-no question to god A. With
independence of what we actually ask, A will always answer either “Da” or “Ja.” Inde-
pendently of what “Da” and “Ja” mean, the answer will not provide information enough
to deterministically identify the three gods at the same time. The reason is given by the
following Information Theory lemma from [5].
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A B C
S1 T F R
S2 T R F
S3 F T R
S4 F R T
S5 R T F
S6 R F T
Table 1. Possible identification scenarios
Lemma C. If a question has N possible answers, these N answers cannot distinguish M > N
different possibilities.
We have already specified that for our case there are 6 possible identification scenarios
(S1–S6 above). Given that there are two possible answers, M = 6 and N = 2. Therefore,
by Lemma C, we cannot distinguish the identities of all three gods altogether.
Second, to provide a two-question solution to the problem in a deterministic way, in virtue
of the same lemma, the first admissible yes-no question must reduce the remaining scenarios
to no more than two. However, the latter cannot deterministically be guaranteed. The reason
is that there is always a chance that A is not-Random. In such a case, after the first question
is answered, we are in a situation where A could be either True or False, so scenarios S1–S4
still remain. Therefore, M = 4 > 2 = N . Notice that there is no admissible first question
that would directly determine the identity of A, since there are M = 3 gods but still N = 2
possible answers to any admissible question. QED. 
In view of this proof, an important remark about the dynamics within the set of admissible
question is in order. Notice that the question (Q) we mentioned above is not an admissible
question as a first question to ask because we do not know the identity of any of the gods yet.
However, it may happen that, after the first question is answered, we gain some information
that will allow (Q) to become an admissible question. In this regard, our set of admissible
questions can be dynamic in relation with our interaction with the gods, and not just static
or absolute. Remarkably enough, our proof does not depend on what is the actual content of
the questions that are being asked, but depends only on the number of possible identification
scenarios in relation with the number of possible answers to our questions. To close the
puzzle in a deterministic way or, which is the same, to match those numbers exactly, it does
not matter what we ask and how the set of admissible questions changes or not: We still
need three yes-no admissible questions. Theorem B establishes that there exists a solution
to Boolos puzzle in three admissible questions and no less. Its proof is existential: It does
not provide an explicit algorithm to solve the puzzle (we do not even need that as algorithms
were already found by Boolos [1] and Roberts [3]).
4. Philosophical relevance of our solution and relation to other works
We would like to clarify and contrast our analysis in relation to some of the previous
works and claims done with respect to the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever and several of its
modifications. In addition, we would like to highlight the philosophical importance of our
interpretation and solution to Boolos’ Hardest Logic Problem Ever since, it seems, a sloppy
reading of it may give a wrong representation. In short, in this Section we demonstrate how
our approach is in line with the original instructions of Boolos’ Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever
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and with Roberts’ three question solution and, as such, it is therefore independent of some
other works that falsely claim to address it.
Let us begin with the apparent issue of the so-called trivialization of Boolos’ puzzle. There
is a tradition among several authors that accepts that Rabern–Rabern [2] are correct when
asserting that if one follows Boolos’ instructions verbatim, then the problem trivializes and,
therefore, is very easy to solve. It is for this reason that, they say, they should modify Boolos’
example in order to make it truly hard. Rabern–Rabern introduce a function from questions
to questions, prove an “embedded question lemma” and then claim that with such a lemma
“the ‘hard’ puzzle is no more difficult than the following trivial puzze” (cf. [2, p. 106]). Their
trivial puzzle also involves three gods, but all of them now speak Truly. Despite this claim, [2]
does not present an explicit solution to Boolos’ original puzzle, and, what is more important,
does not elaborate on what does it actually mean for the puzzle to trivialize.
Furthermore, [2] offers an alternative to Boolos that explicitly supposes some very dis-
putable assumptions. First of all, their reading assumes a Russellian view on semantics as
totally separated from syntax/grammar, and then reduces the puzzle to merely syntactic
terms. Elaborating on this, Random’s behavior is modified and, therefore, depending on the
outcome of the flip of the coin in its head, Random would answer either “Da” or “Ja”, but
not either truly or falsely, as Boolos’ rules specifically demand. Then [2] falsely assumes that
the content of the syntactic expressions “Da” and “Ja” have a role to play in solving the
puzzle. However, as we have demonstrated, first, it does not matter what “Da” and “Ja”
mean (their content) but actually how Random’s either truly or falsely answer sets the fur-
ther possibilities; in other words, how the concrete truth-value of Random’s answer modifies
the possible truth-conditions for the future choices. Second, and more importantly, Rabern-
Rabern interpretation dramatically deviates from Boolos’ spirit: When taking the rules of
the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever at face value, one can learn the real impact on reasoning of
the Law of the Excluded Middle.
Apart from all the previous, we have demonstrated via a logical, abstract argument, that
the puzzle can be deterministically solved only by using at least three admissible questions.
We have proved that the set of admissible questions is a subset of the set of yes-no questions,
which does not necessarily coincide with the subset of self-referential questions as the usually
preferred subset for providing a solution. Deciding whether or not finding such questions –an
algorithm– is a trivial task has no effect in our analysis and is out of the scope of this paper:
We still need three questions. To summarize then, [2] presented a modified puzzle, exactly as
the one by Boolos, but where the behavior of Random is different from Boolos’ instruction
(c). Indeed, instead of Random flipping a coin in its head to decide whether to speak Truly
or Falsely, they assume that Random will always answer either “Da” or “Ja” randomly,
independently of the question. Observe that (c) says that Random fixes its truth value prior
to receiving a question and that it will reply in accordance to it, while the modification in
[2] makes Random not to take into account the actual content of the question, but to rather
receive a question, flip a coin, and then respond according to the outcome. In any case,
[2] presents a three-question solution to their modified puzzle. This case was also studied
by Uzquiano in [4] and Wheeler–Barahona in [5]. In contrast, we are not considering such
puzzle in this work: We do stick to the original instruction (c) by Boolos to answer Boolos’
original puzzle, which as we demonstrate is the hardest logic puzzle of them all. Note that,
if Random were to behave as proposed by Rabern–Rabern, then question (Q) would now be
an admissible question for god Random, but still not admissible for god True. We will come
back to this admissibility issue at the end of Section 5 when computing chances.
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Let us finally consider the two-question solutions given by other works. Those two-question
solutions, though insightful and interesting on their own right, are not solutions to the original
Boolos’ Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever, but to modified versions of it. Indeed, [2, 4, 5] start from
the premise that any yes-no question can be asked to the gods. But then this opens the
possibility of a third, tacit response to a yes-no question: The impossibility to answer. As we
explained before, god True will not be able to answer to question (Q) without violating its
nature. One can think that, when facing (Q), god True will fall into an infinite loop in its
head while trying to decide its response, and it will not be able to reply. To solve this issue,
[2] proposes that, whenever a god enters into such a loop, its head will explode. On the other
hand, [4] proposes that such god will remain silent. Clearly the Law of Non-Contradiction
is being applied in this argument. We, instead, emphasize the significance of the statement
of the puzzle and instruction (d), from which it is immediately deduced that all gods will
reply. Within this setting, the yes-no questions will have exactly the number of outcomes
our intuition expects, that is, two: Either yes or no, and no more.
This leads us naturally to the concept of admissible question and our Theorem B. The
crucial implication of the third response from [2, 4, 5] is the following: From a single question
one is able to distinguish now not two, but three different possibilities. This makes M = 6 and
N = 3 in Lemma C, instead of M = 6 and just N = 2 as in our proof via admissible questions.
Hence, from a single question one is able to extract more information. This extra knowledge is
what allows them to solve a (by now, modified) Boolos-type puzzle in only two questions. This
is in the line of Wintein [6], who not only proves our point regarding the behavior of True and
False (and Random) by providing a three-valued answering function to the modified puzzle
of [2] via formalization of truth theories, but also expands this to a four-valued answering
function to a puzzle with four gods, such as the four roads puzzle. We stress again here the
deviation from Boolos’ instructions and purpose (see Boolos’ quote at the beginning of this
paper) and the dramatic reduction of the puzzle to an almost exclusive use of the Law of
Non-Contradiction. As we claimed, the differentiation between the distinctive outcomes that
either actually provides resides at the bottom of any proper account to inference.
The previous actually gives us more food for thought. For example, one additional unde-
sirable (or, perhaps, convenient) consequence of the exploding-head option of [2] is that, more
likely, the god whose head exploded will not be able to answer any other subsequent question.
This might be a decisive difference with respect to the silent response of [4], in which the
god will still be available to answer further questions. We can also go back to the issue of
trivialization: The reduction to the Law of Non-Contradiction used by [2] and [4] is what
actually made the modified Boolos-type puzzle simpler in the following precise sense: The
algorithms found in [2, 4] to solve such Boolos-type puzzle consist of two questions instead
of three. However, as our Theorem B establishes, it is not possible to solve Boolos’ Hardest
Logic Puzzle Ever (understood at heart in its purest form) in an absolute, deterministic way,
in less than three admissible questions. The last apparent issue we mentioned regarding
two-question solutions (that again, do not apply to Boolos’ original puzzle) is one of our
motivations to understand whether or not it would be possible to solve Boolos’ puzzle in less
than three questions by chance. This new perspective on considering stochastic solutions to
Boolos’ puzzle is addressed in the next Section.
5. Computing the chances
We have demonstrated that Boolos’ puzzle cannot deterministically be solved in less than
three questions. Now, we direct our attention to the second horn of our original concern,
8 J. J. COLOMINA-ALMIN˜ANA AND P. R. STINGA
which is to compute the probabilities to identify the gods without asking any question, by
asking one question and by asking two yes-no admissible questions, respectively.
Theorem D. Consider Boolos’ Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever.
(1) The event{
solve The Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever without asking any questions
}
occurs with probability 1/6.
(2) The event {
solve The Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever by asking one question
}
also occurs with probability 1/6.
(3) The event {
solve The Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever by asking two questions
}
occurs with probability 1/3.
It may sound counterintuitive, but surprisingly enough, no matter what one actually asks,
the probability to find all gods’ identities with only one single admissible yes-no question is
the same that we have to find them without even asking any questions at all! Rolling a dice
could save us some energy and effort.
Proof of Theorem D. For (1), it is clear that there is a probability of 1/6 of solving the puzzle
without even asking a question. Indeed, we can simply roll a 6-faces uniform fair dice, observe
the outcome X, and then pick the corresponding scenario SX from Table 1.
Let us consider (2). Without loss of generality, we address the only question we have
available to god A. There are two possibilities. Either we addressed our question to Random
(with probability 1/3, and we are in scenarios S5–S6) or we addressed our question to a god
that is not Random (with probability 2/3, and we are in scenarios S1–S4). Notice that after
this has happened, we have no questions left. In the first case, where A is Random, there is a
fifty/fifty chance to fall under either scenario S5 or scenario S6. Hence, since we started with
a probability of 1/3 of the question being addressed to Random, and after the first admissible
yes-no question we are left with a 1/2 probability of deciding the correct scenario, the total
probability is then (1/3) × (1/2) = 1/6. In the second case, that of A being non-Random
with probability 2/3, there is a 1/4 probability that one and only one of scenarios S1–S4
occurs. Therefore, the total probability to find the identities of each god in one question in
this second case is (2/3)× (1/4) = 1/6.
Finally, let us show (3), namely, that there is a probability of 1/3 to determine the gods’
identities in only two admissible yes-no questions. Independently of the first question, that
without loss of generality we address to A, and its answer, A is either Random with proba-
bility 1/3 or not-Random with probability 2/3. In the first case, that is, A being Random,
we are again in scenarios S5 or S6. We can use the second question to further decide in an
absolute, deterministic way, that is, with probability 1, whether we are actually situated in
either scenario S5 or scenario S6. Indeed, ask god B the question Does da mean yes iff Rome
is in Italy? God B will answer Da if and only if B is True, and will answer Ja if and only
if B is False. Therefore, the total probability for this case is (1/3)× 1 = 1/3. In the second
case, we fall under scenarios S1–S4, where we know that A is not random. By using the
same question as before, we identify A as either True or False with probability 1. This means
that we can narrow down the space of epistemic possibilities to either S1–S2 or S3–S4. Say
we are situated in the space S1–S2. Then, there is a probability of 1/2 of having either S1
or S2 as the correct identification scenario. (The same actually holds for the other space).
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Hence, the total probability is (2/3)× 1× (1/2) = 1/3. And with this our computations are
done. QED. 
Our proof of part (3) of Theorem D is consistent with the original strategy of Boolos:
“Your first move is to find a god who you can be certain is not Random” [1]. After that you
ask to the not-Random god the question Does Da mean yes iff Rome is in Italy? to decide
if you are talking to god True or god False.
It is a remarkable fact that, independently of having a static or dynamic set of admissi-
ble questions, the event {identify the gods in 3 questions} occurs with probability 1, while
{identify the gods in less than 3 questions} has probability strictly less than 1. It is impossi-
ble to solve Boolos’ original puzzle in two questions in a deterministic way. Notice, however,
that once the event {identify the gods in 2 questions} has occurred (and this would happen
1 out of 3 times, as part (3) of Theorem D showed), the gods have definitely been identified,
with absolute certainty.
As we mentioned in Section 4, one can also think about whether a yes-no question is
admissible or not, but now from a stochastic point of view. Though we believe this topic
is deserving of deeper analysis, we just mention here a simple observation. Say we consider
question (Q) as a first question. Flipping the coin in its head means that Random is speaking
truly with probability 1/2. Then (Q) is not an admissible question not only for god True,
but also for god Random. So the probability that (Q) is an admissible question when posed
to any of the gods in the first step of our algorithm to solve the puzzle is (1/2)× (1/3) = 1/6.
On the other hand, Random speaks falsely with probability 1/2. In this case (Q) is not
admissible only for god True. Thus the probability that (Q) is admissible in the first step of
a solution algorithm in this case is (1/2)× (2/3) = 1/3.
6. Conclusion
The proper understanding of Boolos’ original purpose when proposing The Hardest Logic
Puzzle Ever and the correct interpretation of the statement and its instructions are crucial,
as we have demonstrated in our paper, to offer a satisfactory solution to the puzzle and to
consider the natural issue of admissibility of the questions posed to the gods. To address
the puzzle properly, one has to put close attention to Boolos’ requirements and intentions,
specifically to the claim that the Law of Excluded Middle is a better explanatory source for
certain ways of reasoning than the Law of Non-Contradiction. This is the main difference
that, as the present article evidences, one can find in solutions to variations of the puzzle,
and it is the reason why they fail to be proper answers to Boolos’ original formulation of
the puzzle. By rescuing the spirit and form of Boolos’ Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever, we have
reinforced and done justice to such a claim. In particular, we still believe that Boolos’ Hardest
Logic Puzzle Ever is indeed the hardest logic puzzle ever, as one must be clever enough to
find three admissible yes-no questions that the gods need to answer in order to solve it.
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